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This article explores a few alternatives to the traditional economic theories regarding 
the problem of global dissemination of knowledge and technology to developing 
countries. In particular, it examines three cases in which the classical notion of 
intellectual property rights seems to have been used in favor of developing countries, 
both through its orthodox application and through more liberal views of such legal 
institution. The first case deals with the phenomenon of peer production through 
electronic networks; the second discusses the regulation of trademarks in the context 
of collective rights; and finally, the third case tackles the recent problem of the so-
called "abandonwares" and its implications of economic and legal nature. 
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Résumé 
Cet article explore certaines alternatives aux théories économiques classiques 
concernant le problème de la diffusion du savoir et de la technologie en direction des 
pays en développement. Il analyse en particulier trois situations dans lesquelles la 
notion classique de droits de propriété intellectuelle semble avoir été utilisée en 
faveur des pays en développement, à travers une application soit  traditionnelle soit 
plus libérale de ces droits. L’article examine tout d’abord le phénomène du “travail 
collaboratif” (peer production) dans les réseaux électroniques; puis discute de la 
régulation des marques  dans le contexte des droits collectifs; avant de traiter du  
récent problème dit du “abandonwares” (l’abandon de vieux logiciels) et de ses 
implications économiques et juridiques. 
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This article explores a few alternatives to the traditional and economic theories 
regarding the problem of global dissemination of knowledge and technology to 
developing countries. In particular, it examines three particular cases in which the 
classical notion of intellectual property rights may be used in favor of developing 
countries, both through its orthodox application or through more liberal views of such 
legal institution.  
 
As previously discussed by this author, the disparity of political interests between 
developed and developing countries may raise transaction costs for the conclusion of 
efficient international agreements in the particular market of technology transfers 
(Tang, 2008). It is true that a proper manipulation of negotiation strategies, such as 
relying on certain bilateral forms of cooperation together with the existing multilateral 
agreements, could substantially overcome such costs and lead to more effective 
institutional arrangements in the current global geography of technological 
development, particularly when regarding the influence of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) over the current WTO-TRIPS Agreement.   
 
However, even within such an institutional arrangement, a substantial part of 
developing countries could still fail to overcome the technological gap with the highly 
industrialized countries by means of international technology transfers, despite the 
continuous efforts of nations in the last two decades for implementing the multilateral 
trade agreements crystallized in the form of the WTO and the TRIPS framework, 
together with the more than 4,000 BITs elsewhere.1 Some authors also claim that it is 
the form of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection that is actually preventing 
higher flows of technology to developing countries: if current IPR were more flexible 
towards patents and industrial technologies, they say, technology transfers would be 
much more intense and regular among Northern and Southern countries (Bagwell et 
al., 1998). 
 
In sum, while many scholars agree that certain levels of international IPR 
(“intellectual property rights”) protection may be fundamental for encouraging higher 
scales of technology inflows and knowledge dissemination across the globe, it still 
remains controversial in the literature what would be the best strategy to attain such 
                                                 
1 In this sense, some scholars argue that this problem is not the multilateral treaty’s fault; rather, it is the 
growing dominance of bilateral agreements between developed and developing countries that has been 
undermining the general effects of the multilateral framework. Hence, they conclude that such treaties 
should be deemed illegal under international trade law, despite the absence of a clear jurisprudence or 
interpretation of any rule on this subject. In any case, it may be possible that the traditional argument 
against regionalization and bilateralization may be correct for other aspects of international trade – in 
particular those mostly affected by tariff distortions – and that the inclusion of intellectual property 
rights in the WTO’s single undertaking principle could have been more based on political rather than 
economic or developmental reasons. See e.g. Dunkley (2000). 
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optimal levels of transfers, and whether any particular strategy can conflict with 
another being simultaneously pursued in the arena of domestic policies and 
international relations. The following cases attempt to provide an indication of these 
particular strategies that can align with the classical model of IPR protection or with 
more liberal applications of such standard, although achieving possibly similar 
positive results for developing countries. 
 
 
I. PEER PRODUCTION AS A CHALLENGE TO THE TRADITIONAL 
MODEL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION 
 
1. Characteristics of the Peer Production system 
 
If asked to introduce the peer production model in only a few words, most cyberlaw 
experts would certainly begin to describe how this category of collaborative 
production system became distinguished by the presence of thousands of voluntaries 
contributing to the successful achievement of a given intellectual task (Benkler, 2002). 
By making use of each agent’s specific abilities, or just by providing its automated 
resources, the peer production only demands the “creative” work to be performed by a 
small group of moderators or specifically designed software’s, despite the uncountable 
number of continuous contributions. 
 
However, although not technically a new model of productivity, the peer production 
system has only become noticed as an innovative form of creation with the wide 
dissemination of the Internet. One of the first and most well-known, although only 
recently recognized as an example of peer productive method, is the collaborative 
work in the academic environment, where a large and continuously growing number 
of researchers, students and professors contribute to each other on the production of a 
body of knowledge, without any clear expectation of monetary reward or centralized 
coordination.  
 
The case of the peer productivity in the academic environment is more visible when 
one speaks about the research in Mathematics: provided that mathematical discoveries 
cannot, by definition, be appropriated or have their use excluded, the community of 
Mathematicians would not have any incentive to contribute to each other, according to 
the traditional economic theory. However, it is widely known that Mathematicians are 
one of the most collaborative scholars among any other discipline, where individuals 
continuously review, criticize, increase and refine each other’s contributions. And 
most important, people who contribute to the development of logical theorems and 
solutions never consider about preventing others from using their discoveries, even if 
the access is completely free (Simon, 2002). 
 
Peer production, in this sense, was already present in the society, even if it was only 





the growth of communication networks which suddenly empowered the potentials of 
this method to other, more complex economic ventures. 
 
With the development of cheap and fast communication systems, particularly with the 
widespread use of the Internet, new incentives – which could not be identified by the 
market or by centralized structures of management, unlike prices or hierarchy-based 
commands – have risen in order to mobilize countless numbers of individuals across 
the world. Those people behave through small time-consuming collaborations in 
different projects, from scientific data-analysis (such as the so-called SETI@home 
project) to the creation of virtual environments (Everquest and MUD tools), or from 
the enhancement of open-source softwares (e.g. Linux) to the collective management 
of a football team (such as the now deceased Web Football Club in the Second 
Division of the French National League1) or the building of a real-time updated 
encyclopedia (being Wikipedia the most famous case). 
 
These phenomena are clear examples of how peer production mechanisms are able, in 
these days, to challenge the classical notions of property and organization which 
prevail under the market-firm scheme. In the following section, we will discuss in 
detail to which extent those traditional pillars of productivity are disputable – if they 
actually are – with regard to this new proposed model. 
 
2. A shift from Coase’s paradigms towards the peer production model 
 
In order to understand the level of breakthrough which may have been brought by the 
peer production, we need to rely on the fact that most of the traditional models of 
production were dominantly oriented by the thoughts of economist Ronald Coase, 
who presented one of the most important issues concerning the nature of the market, 
of the firm and the law (Coase, 1960). 
 
Coase’s arguments can be summarized from the general idea of transaction costs 
taking place between agents and individuals in the market, which derive from the 
problems associated with the enforcement of property rights and contracts. In this 
sense, Coase understands firms as a mechanism to avoid transaction costs, but only to 
the limit where those are able to work as clusters of resources and agents, as well as 
managing them through a system of hierarchy-based commands.  
 
However, while firms may reduce transaction costs, organizational costs also arise 
from these structures, so that the sum of every cost determines if the production will 
be based on a market or on a firm system. In addition, law, as a system of ubiquitous 
norms that regulate the basic pieces of the economy (property and contract), has a 
crucial role in this framework to the extent that it can either increase or reduce 
                                                 
1 For further information, see The Sun newspaper report at http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/ homepage/ 
sport/ football/article216518.ece. 
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transaction/organization costs, leading to an institutional role in the organization of the 
production. 
 
What is interesting to notice in these basic features of Coase’s paradigms is that agents 
behave in a productive environment according to a very limited set of incentives, 
namely: a price, a command or a future reward. More important, those incentives 
strongly depend on a reliable presence of property rights and contracts. Nevertheless, 
peer production directly challenges this sort of incentives, since neither a hierarchical 
command, nor a price, or a future monetary reward create any incentives to the current 
peer production collaborations. And because these traditional incentives cannot 
explain the sustainability of the peer production systems (Ginsburg, 2001), other types 
of motivation are proposed: for instance, social-psychological incentives which are 
embedded in certain category of informational projects, such as reputation (a very 
convincing argument for the case of the community of Mathematicians) or mere self-
amusement, as long as these do not consume a large part of the contributor’s time. 
 
With this regard, commons-based peer production frameworks have become able to 
expand the potential of these new incentives mainly because of two major factors. 
First, due to the strong reduction of communication costs, represented by the 
widespread use of the Internet. Second, because the structure of the peer production 
methods allows a large number of people to contribute, at any time, with only a small 
increment, however pooled on a very modularized task (Benkler, 2004). Thus, 
organization costs become relatively reduced because neither time-coordination will 
be fundamental, nor allocation costs will arise (since individuals will decide by 
themselves where to concentrate their abilities on a fine-grained, although complex, 
entrepreneurial project). In sum, the two factors mentioned above will avoid what a 
Coasean argument would call “information loss” – the problem with assigning the 
appropriate agent and resource to a certain task – as well as the integration 
inefficiency, which would prevent individuals from collaborating with each other.  
 
Accordingly, this explains why peer production models do not really contradict 
Coase’s paradigms, but rather expand his arguments from a new structure of 
organization deriving from technological advances. In addition, peer production will 
provide a few advantages over the usual set in market or in the firms. Since the 
allocation of agents and resources can be assigned to the own contributors at the best 
information available, self-assignment will be possible for each peer to its most 
adequate task, so that information loss will be reverted into information gains (Bar-
Gill et al, 2003). Moreover, it will allow larger groups to concentrate on a single, fine-
grained objective, leading to a more efficient allocation and use of resources. 
 
3. Challenges to the peer production model: motivation and organization 
 
Although apparently more efficient than the market-based and firm-based models, 





questions. As stated before, peer production systems might enjoy the ability of 
informational gains and full allocation of resources at an asynchronous level. 
However, in order to make these features possible, peer production projects must fit 
into certain organizational requirements. 
 
The first requirement, as already mentioned before, is that peer production ventures 
must be divisible into modules, where each can be produced independently from the 
production of others. This feature will avoid costs related to time and allocation of 
better-qualified agents.  
 
Second, each divisible component should be preferably small in size, so that no 
project will demand a large amount of continuous efforts from a single contributor. 
Rather, very small talks will easily adapt to each contributor’s level of motivation, as 
well as it will produce higher productivity from a large number of resources into a 
small component of the project.  
 
Third, although peer production projects are free from hierarchical costs, some level 
of integration must be present. This requirement can be implemented through the use 
of the so-called “peer-review” mechanisms, which allows for continuous quality 
control and consistency between components. It is interesting to notice that, for the 
case of certain projects related to content production (e.g., Wikipedia), such a feature 
will also cover problems related to accreditation of the source and enforcement of 
third-party copyrights (Varian, 2005), since the task of finding the reputation of the 
producer will be left to the last user and, therefore, to the sum of previous reviewers of 
the content. 
 
4. Normative and economic implications 
 
It is not difficult to see that the emergence of a new, possibly dominant mode of 
production based on collaborative and commons structure will affect several pillars in 
the institutional setting, particularly in the case of property rights and contracts. 
Traditional justifications for appropriation of resources no longer fall into every 
category of production. For instance, intellectual property rights will suffer, and is 
already suffering, a number of theoretical challenges in the view of the so-called 
Creative Commons project, as well as many of the open-source movements around the 
world.1 The idea of exclusive rights loses more ground for new notions of free access 
and incentives for the expansion of productivity in certain fields of information and 
culture, and what is more important, with the support of serious economic arguments 
behind it. 
                                                 
1 The Creative Commons is a non-profit organization whose aim is to design the protection of 
intellectual property rights in a manner to facilitate the use and share of creative works among people. 
For a discussion on its legal and social implications, see Wagner (2003) and the Creative Commons 
website, at http://www.creativecommons.org 
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II. RESHAPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES THROUGH 
COLLECTIVE RIGHTS: THE CASE OF THE AMAZONIAN “CUPUAÇU”  
 
1. An overview of the “Amazonian tragedy” 
 
Since the early colonization period in the Americas during the 15th century, the vast 
natural wealth of the Amazon rainforest has been subjected to various forms of 
predatory exploitation and misappropriation. Today, after the recent trends of 
economic globalization expressed through the radicalization of traditional intellectual 
property rights, biological resources are suffering another – though by different means 
– wave of international misuse of property rights over collective assets, with a 
remarkable difference: local communities are now being impeded to keep on with 
their traditional culture and development (Fabricant et al, 2001).  
 
Such a kind of “neo-colonization” has gained expression mainly by initiative of large 
companies or multinational research centers based in developed countries. These 
actors usually appropriate the Amazonian natural resources through the use of 
recognized legal mechanisms such as the so-called “patent rights”, which have already 
been granted on practically every well-known Amazonian and Andean medicinal 
plants (Schidlehner, 2003), including those of Andiroba (Carapa guianensis Aubl.), 
Copaiba (Copaifera sp), Cat’s Claw (Uncaria tomentosa), Maca (Lepidium meyenii), 
Sangre de Drago (Croton lechleri), Quebra-Pedras (Phyllanthus niruri), and 
Wormseed (Chenopodium ambrosioides). 
 
Resistance, however, has been visible on several entities who act against the abuse of 
certain protections of the law. One of these movements has become internationally 
recognized as a leading case against the exploitation of collective resources: the 
Cupuaçu case. In December 2002, the Cupuaçu – a typical Amazonian fruit whose 
many kinds of derivatives (like oils and chocolates) have been traditionally produced 
by local communities – has become subject to a strong campaign carried out by a 
group of Brazilian NGOs, whose sensitivity to the issue of biopiracy laid the 
guidelines for a countermovement against the overuse of individual property rights. 
The operation has been coordinated by the Brazilian network Amazonian Work Group 
(GTA) in collaboration with Amazonlink.org, other NGOs and groups of small and 
medium producers, covered by strategies including workshops, websites and 
awareness-raising activities amongst local communities and general media. 
 
One of these activist entities, the NGO Amazonlink, took on a chief role over those 
efforts when it casually noticed the existence of several patent applications (mostly in 
developed countries) on cupuaçu derivatives. Moreover, Amazonlink also discovered 
that the name of the fruit had been registered as a trademark in the same countries by a 
Japanese company named Asahi Foods and its allied American conglomerate, 





indigenous communities, have had their typical names trademarked (for instance, 
AçaíTM, Sangre de DragoTM and CupuaçuTM). In fact, most of these illegitimate 
registrations have also been extended to protection in the realm of the Internet, such as 
the use of internet domains for commercial purposes (e.g., www.cupuacu.com, 
www.cupuacu-int.com, www.sangrededrago.com, www.yanomami.com and 
www.ashaninka.com).1 
 
In sum, the Cupuaçu campaign, by assembling political initiatives with legal actions 
pursued in national courts, went beyond the mere discussion over patents and also had 
to address a variety of legal issues concerning piracy of biological resources and 
cultural inheritance. A first complaint was submitted against the trademark number 
4126269 CUPUAÇU registered at the Japanese Patent Office. In addition, a group of 
NGOs plans to file against a request for patent EP1219698A1 on Cupuaçu oils and 
chocolate at the European Patent Office in Germany. 
 
The following sections, mostly extracted from the Amazonlink reports, explain the 
developments and importance of the Cupuaçu case in more detail. More importantly, 
it reflects how the use of intellectual property rights in an orthodox fashion can 
frequently be advantageous for developing countries and their local communities. 
 
2. Cupuaçu fruit: features, economic uses and means for local development 
 
2.1. Features of Cupuaçu fruit and traditional applications 
 
Cupuaçu (Theobroma grandiflorum) is a small to medium-size tree in the rainforest 
canopy that can reach up to 20 meters in height. Its fruit, which ripens in the rainy 
months of summer, is generally regarded as a primary food source for both indigenous 
peoples and animals in the region. It is very well known for its creamy, exotic-tasting 
pulp, making it highly demanded in certain South American cities. The fruit pulp has 
been used in Brazil and Peru to make fresh juice, ice cream, jam and other typical 
derivatives. Furthermore, Cupuaçu has a close familiarity with the cocoa-tree 
(Theobroma cacao L.), so that its seeds can also serve for the production of chocolate-
like products. Cupuaçu-chocolate has been produced in Brazil since 1983 and is 
known as “Cupulate”. However, cupuaçu is very distinguishable from the usual cocoa 
fruit due to certain nutritional properties. Differently from cocoa, cupuaçu does not 
contain substances like theobromine (a similar additive like caffeine) which makes it a 
healthier alternative to cocoa-made chocolate.2  
 
With regard to its traditional uses, the cultivation of the cupuaçu fruit has not only 
been important as a food source but also as an essential element of certain 
                                                 
1 See generally, Biopiracy in the Amazon – Cupuaçu, at http://www.amazonlink.org/biopiracy/ 
cupuacu.htm. See also Grupo de Trabalho Amazônico (GTA), at http://www.gta.org.br 
2 See Biopiracy in the Amazon – Cupuaçu, at http://www.amazonlink.org/biopiracy/cupuacu.htm. 
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conventional rituals. First, its role as a primary food source is known for many 
generations among indigenous and local communities spread in the Amazon forest, 
distributed along the Rio Negro and Orinoco rivers. In addition, cupuaçu trees have 
been very important for religious and medical purposes, as its seeds were used by 
indigenous people who drink cupuaçu-made beverages after they have been blessed 
by a shaman to facilitate difficult births. Those seeds also have applications by the 
indigenous Tikuna tribes for abdominal pains. 
 
2.2. Economic potential – the Cupuaçu Chocolate (“cupulate”) 
 
One of the most important features in the cultivation of cupuaçu fruits is the 
possibility to produce chocolate-like products, due to the close relationship of the 
cupuaçu tree to the cocoa-tree (Theobroma cacao L.). In this sense, Brazil has a 
relatively advanced industrial and trading policy regarding the development of this 
kind of foodstuff, mainly represented by initiatives in the northern region where the 
production of the so-called "cupulate" is well known. 
 
On the other hand, the economic potential of the cupulate has already gathered 
attention from competitors in developed countries, with little rewards from primary 
producers in the Amazon region. In Japan, for example, this product has already been 
produced and commercialized in large scale: in the first quarter of the year 2002, the 
Amazon state has registered the export of nearly 50 tons of cupuaçu seeds to Japan, 
with an expectation that this amount will increase to more than 200 tons of chocolate 
production in the following years. 
  
3. The disputes over the use of cupuaçu – collective vs. individual property rights 
 
3.1. Foreign patent registrations over cupuaçu 
 
As a consequence of the facts seen above, several aggressive initiatives from Japanese 
companies in order to produce and commercialize cupuaçu-based products have led to 
a series of legal issues in some national courts. Currently, there are registered patents 
and also some applications for patents concerning the techniques of extracting 
cupuaçu-pulp and the production of cupuaçu chocolate.  
 
According to those patents, the alleged inventor of cupulate was Mr. Nagasawa 
Makoto, who is at director of Asahi Foods and also owner of the American company 
"Cupuacu International Inc." that holds some patents worldwide on the Cupuaçu fruit. 
It is interesting to notice that almost every patent abovementioned was registered by 

























Cosmetic composition comprising 
cupuaçu extract 
GB 2321644A 
Asahi Foods Co., 
Ltd* 
Japan 30/10/2001 
Lipids originating from cupuaçu, 
method of producing the same and 
use thereof 
JP 2001299278 
Asahi Foods Co., 
Ltd* 
Japan 18/12/2001 
Oil and fat derived from cupuaçu – 
Theobroma grandiflorum seed, 
method for producing the same and 
its use 
JP2001348593 





Fat originating in cupuaçu seed, 
process for producing the same and 
use thereof 
EP 1219698A1 
Asahi Foods Co., 
Ltd* 
WIPO 03/07/2002 
Fat originating in cupuaçu seed, 
process for introducing the same 






Cupua seed-origin fat, process for 




3.2. Trademark Registrations over the name “Cupuaçu”  
in Japan, USA and Europe 
 
Besides the registration of patents, Japanese companies have also registered the name 
"Cupuaçu" as a Trademark for various product classes (including chocolate) in Japan, 
the European Union and in the US.  
 
According to the Amazonlink website, it was reported that the lawyers of Asahi Foods 
Co., Ltd. threatened with fines up to $10.000 to a company who was using the name 
"cupuaçu" on the label of a cupuaçu jelly in Germany. However, several European 
companies which are using such a name are under dispute with Asahi Foods in the EU 
over the rights of the use of the word "Cupuaçu" for their products. Amazonlink was 
also subject to attention from legal representatives of Asahi Foods: as the website 
reports, “when checking out export possibilities for sweets and other Cupuaçu 
products to Germany, Amazonlink.org was told to let the word "Cupuaçu" under no 
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3.3. Reactions in Brazil – from political to legal action 
 
After becoming aware of the infringements over the legitimate use of cupuaçu, leaders 
and organizations in Brazil started a mass campaign in order to attract attention from 
the civil society and the government.  
 
The Brazilian government, in this sense, has been very receptive and supportive in the 
coordination of the Brazilian campaign. The Brazilian President, Mr. Luis Inacio Lula 
da Silva, with the cooperation of his Environment Minister Ms. Marina Silva, is 
known for his policies against forms of biopiracy and provided full political support in 
the battlefield of the Cupuaçu case under national courts and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. Such a strong embracement comes from the idea that the 
Cupuaçu case could become a world “landmark” in the empowerment of local 
communities, not only with regard to Amazonian and Brazilian civil society but also 
in other parts of the globe (Schmidlehner, 2003).  
 
3.4. Deep in the legal battle: a victory for the recognition of collective property 
rights 
 
It is important to bear in mind that no progress in the field of collective property rights 
could be achieved unless the technical-legal tools were properly operated. In the 
following we will describe some of the main arguments which were presented under 
the Japanese Patent Office and led to an important victory for local communities in 
Brazil. 
The main function of a trademark is to inform potential buyers about the origin of 
traded goods and services, as well as their distinct features. Companies enjoy a wide 
range of alternatives in order to achieve this objective – may it be through the use of 
words, logotypes, shapes or even sounds. For a name, logo or sound to be considered 
a trademark and, thus, to be able to be registered, must be distinctive. Therefore, a 
pure descriptive name does not provide any assistance to the consumer to identify the 
origin of products, so that it cannot be regarded as a valid trademark. 
 
During the administrative procedure under the Japanese Patent Office, the leading 
argument by the applicants was based on the distinctive character of the name 
“cupuaçu”, which is nothing else than the popular, typically Brazilian-indigenous 
name, associated to the tree (and its fruit and seeds) known in the scientific 
community as Theobroma grandiflorum.1 
 
Moreover, before choosing a name as a trademark, several factors related to the 
distinctiveness of the designation must be carefully evaluated. In the international 
                                                 
1 The case was brought by Amazonlink in collaboration with the Brazilian Institute for International 
Trade Law and Development (IDCID). The reports accounted in this article can be found in more detail 





arena, there are five categories which are applied to assess the level of distinctiveness 
of a mark: creative marks, arbitrary marks, suggestive marks, descriptive marks and 
generic names. Among these mentioned categories, in general, only the generic marks 
cannot be registered as trademarks. 
 
In the Cupuaçu case, the problem of the name “cupuaçu” is evident: no one should be 
able to register a generic name which merely serves to designate the raw material or 
primary resource of the traded product, since it would leave no space for other 
competitors to choose another plausible alternative for denominating such a material.  
 
For instance, in the case that a Brazilian company would decide to use the name 
“cupuaçu” in the label of a frozen cupuaçu pulp and commercialize it in one of the 25 
Member States of the European Union, in the United States or in Japan, that company 
would be impeded to use such a designation in its labels and forced to create another 
name capable of referring to the main raw material of the traded good. In other words, 
registrations of this kind would end up by creating a non-tariff barrier to trade, 
obstacles to free competition and, last but not least, they would transfer a Brazilian 
cultural heritage from the public domain to the private sphere. 
 
Under these arguments, and one year after the beginning of the administrative 
procedure, the trademark annulment action was decided on March 1st 2004 by the 
Japanese Patent Office. The JPO examiners fully agreed with the arguments of the 
Brazilian NGOs and decided to cancel the trademark under dispute. In short, the 
decision was grounded on the following arguments: 
a) The designation “cupuaçu” is the name of a fruit from which oils and food 
derivatives can be extracted; since it is utilized to distinguish these oils and 
derivatives, the name is a common designation for a raw material and, therefore, falls 
under the prohibition of Article 3(1)(iii) of the Japanese Trademark Law; 
b) On the grounds of consumer and competition protection, and by relying on 
Article 4(1)(xvi) of the Japanese Trademark Law, the JPO examiners have considered 
that the possible existence of mark named “cupuaçu” is capable of misleading 
consumers, to the extent that it was registered in 1998 by Asahi Foods company in 
order to designate foodstuffs which had in their composition any oils or derivatives 
from cupuaçu fruit. Thus, in this specific case, the registering company could produce 
a foodstuff without ant cupuaçu oil or derivative, but with a trademark “cupuaçu” in 
its label. 
 
With this decision, the administrative procedure has ended in Japan. Moreover, the 
deadline for any appellation by the Japanese company has expired, so that the 
revocation of the trademark has become definite in April 2004. Such a battle became a 
leading case for the preservation of the Brazilian cultural and biological heritage, 
although many other designations must still be recovered: that is the case of Brazilian 
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names such as “acerola”, “açaí”, “cachaça”, among other purely national names which 
were registered at patent offices around the world.1 
 
4. Policy impacts: local development through fair use of intellectual property law 
 
In the background of such a complex problem that we described above, the most 
important issue which must be kept in mind is that the Western traditional concept of 
“property” is not necessarily intrinsic to certain indigenous cultures and modes of 
production. Some argue that the non-conformity of these local traditions with the 
domain of individual property rights has led to discrimination against these 
communities and caused some levels of economic disadvantage. They are condemned 
to be permanent losers in a system whose rules are established and constantly 
manipulated in the upstream rule-makers.  
 
It is true that proceeding with requests for the annulment of patents and trademarks are 
only one of the many possible strategies in the difficult task of promoting the 
autonomy of indigenous communities. The use of legal procedures and the creation of 
new institutional rules in order to protect traditional knowledge may improve the 
protection of their lifestyle, but will not resolve the problem in the long run. Aside 
from mere economic arguments, the enforcement of sustainable development and fair 
relations with traditional cultures must go beyond the limits imposed by international 
trade laws. For instance, some activists contend that patents on life forms must be 
prohibited in any case, together with the review of many concepts embedded in the 
notion of intellectual property itself. 
 
Finally, a new global and social trend can be fortunately observed in the example we 
have analyzed above. Issues concerning biopiracy seem to be increasingly unifying 
different social and political groups. It is a common concern among Brazilian citizens 
the fact that a Japanese company registers trademarks and patents belonging to an 
Amazonian culture.  
 
On the other hand, many different ideas arise about what the meaning of fighting 
biopiracy, which generates many internal disputed on which approach should be 
adopted. Some people say, for example, the preservation of biological and cultural 
diversity should be done by strengthening indigenous groups as autonomous partners 
in this process. In a more radical stream, conservative groups in Brazil argue that even 
NGOs and indigenous organizations are responsible for facilitating biopiracy and 
causing what they usually call the “internationalization” of the Amazon forest. Hence, 
these groups propose the build of large-scale military and surveying projects, as well 
as the review of environmental and indigenous policies under the interests of “national 
                                                 
1 To have an idea of its significance, the Brazilian President sanctioned a new law (Lei 11.675, of 19 




security”. This discussion, however, is fully placed in the political field and depends 
on a strong participation from the entire society. 
 
 
III. “ABANDONWARES” AND ORPHANED WORKS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
1. What are orphan works and “abandonwares”? 
 
This last case is currently the most undeveloped and controversial in the legal and 
economic literature. In times where there have been intense debates about the current 
role of intellectual property law in the era of Internet, one particular problem has 
arisen without any deeper attention from society. While it is very common among 
scholars to discuss on how to face the deliberate misappropriation and well-known 
practices of “piracy” against valuable intellectual property goods, little consideration 
has been given to the legality of using no longer valuable copyrighted works – or at 
least no longer valuable for ordinary commerce.1 
 
However, because of its increasing presence, such a practice still remains in a limbo 
between the notion of legitimate use and fair protection of property rights. With only a 
few exceptions, copyrighted works are always kept within their terms of protection 
but are frequently becoming unavailable to the public after a short period. This is the 
case of what has been generally named “abandonwares” and orphan works.2  
 
Abandonwares and orphan works share a very similar problem, which consists on the 
transfer or authorization of using intellectual property rights. Nonetheless, each 
category bears a difficulty at a different level of property rights: in abandonwares, it is 
the non-availability of a copyrighted work, while in orphan works is the non-
locatability of the copyright owner. An orphan work is a very specific case where the 
copyrighted work has owners who are difficult or even impossible to locate, and thus 
no license to copy or to issue copies can be legally obtained. Abandonwares, on the 
other hand, are softwares belonging to copyright owners whose identity may be 
known or locatable, but owners are not willing or interested in supplying the software. 
For this reason, the computer industry has devoted much more attention to prevent the 
use of abandonwares than of orphan works. 
 
2. The problem raised within the framework of classical copyright law and 
economics 
 
Under ordinary copyright law, there is an exclusive right of the owner of a 
copyrighted work to dispose on the manipulation and issuing of copies of his work, 
                                                 
1 See Kevin Savetz, “Can "Abandonware" Revive Forgotten Programs?” byte.com, at 
http://www.savetz.com/ articles/ byte-abandonware. php?sort= date. 
2 It should be noted that there are cases where no commercial copies are for sale but no abandonment is 
either observed, because the copyright owner is available and willing to license the work. 
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that means, either the reproductive or transformative (derivative) use. The idea lying 
under this protection is that copyright owners earn profits by granting licenses or 
selling copies against a fee. However, since copyright law does not oblige copies of 
the work to be made available to the public, the owner is able to stop the distribution 
of his work at free will, even if the work may still be useful, although surpassed by a 
more sophisticated version (which replaces the older work). 
 
Such a practice from the industry suggests the existence of two dominant categories of 
abandonment1: (1) commercial abandonment, where the supply of the software is no 
longer commercially profitable or becomes unpopular, due to new hardware 
technologies and consumer preferences; and (2) strategic abandonment, where the 
owner ceases the supply in order to replace it by a newer version. 
 
Since both distributors and consumers may still find utility or have actual needs for 
those copies, the unavailability of a copyrighted work under those circumstances 
becomes an issue outside the scope of ordinary copyright laws. As opposed to 
common sense, abandonwares may have many uses, starting from mere retro-
computing enthusiasts to people who need to run old filetypes in modern computers, 
including researchers who make use of old softwares as sources.  
 
From an economic perspective, even if copyrighted owners make their works 
unavailable to the public, this does not imply that they are no longer being used or 
demanded. Rather, where a demand which is not being fulfilled by the market still 
exists, this would lead to the rise of a missing market, which copyright law was not 
designed to predict or prevent. 
 
Accordingly, the enlargement of that missing market gives space to a number of 
problems. For instance, as newer and more advanced versions of softwares are being 
issued in the market, old computer hardwares are likely to not be capable of 
supporting them. Therefore, the exclusive supply of new versions might force 
consumers to unnecessarily upgrade their hardwares with respect to their needs. 
 
Another common problem in forbidding abandonwares is the further unavailability of 
source codes to modify a computer program, either in a way to correct or improve a 
computer application. Although this may be easily solved within the classical 
framework, which considers the source code as a trade secret (and thus legally able to 
be undisclosed), the economic problem arises when the software publisher goes out of 
business or stop the support service for its software, making consumers helpless when 
patches are needed. As a consequence, users are forced to adapt under higher costs, 
                                                 
1 Although D. Khong (pp. 4-5) also finds a third category (temporary abandonment), we believe that 
such cannot be properly considered a kind of “abandonment”, to the extent that it will, in a future event, 




mainly by switching to a whole new set of systems without the benefit of using a 
cheaper and simpler patch. 
 
The examples above demonstrate that current copyright law, although designed to 
protect and give incentives for technological advances, is also unable to cope with the 
need for efficient uses of all varieties of copyrighted works. 
 
3. Outlining some solutions 
 
In the case of softwares, rather than other types of media (songs or books), 
orphanhood does not seem to be a very complicated issue, since the dawn of the large-
scale software production was introduced in a period when the alertness with 
intellectual property rights was already spread and established. Therefore, it is very 
likely that almost every computer program made commercially available has been 
duly registered and now it has become easy to track virtually any copyright owner.  
 
Nevertheless, some changes in the current registration system should still be proposed. 
One of the major suggestions being made in this sense is the modification of the 
copyright registration system determined by the Berne Convention, which requires no 
formality for the subsistence of copyright protection. Any procedure requiring more 
traceability at an early stage for registration would, in principle, create incentives for 
fewer disputes on orphan works. In alternative, even if the absence of formality may 
be regarded as a protected principle in intellectual property law, at least an ex post 
dispute solution procedure which would be entitled to confer a “first come first 
served” property for orphan works would foster proper incentives for companies to 
duly register their creations. 
 
Abandonment, in its turn, seems to be a much more serious challenge than 
orphanhood. Both issues are interrelated, to the extent that orphanhood remains a 
minor problem when the final licensing choice is left to the copyright owner: the mere 
existence of an efficient registration system in order to cope with orphanhood would 
not be sufficient in cases where licensing cannot be reasonably obtained even when 
the copyright owner is known. 
 
Arguments in favor of the free use of abandoned softwares tend to support 
mechanisms which are capable of inducing the copyright owner to abandon his 
copyright, or at least to induce the company not to have an idle behavior towards his 
older creations.  Such a mechanism could be enforced through the imposition of a 
copyright renewal system, where the failure to renew after a certain period would lead 
to the termination of the copyright. Since most computer programs tend not to last in 
the market for a period of more than 5 years (when they are unavoidably replaced or 
updated), this copyright protection should last for a reasonable short period between 
the necessary investment recovery and effective abandonment by suppliers. Moreover, 
an incentive for copyright owners to abandon their creations could consist on charging 
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a fee with respect to the renewal of the license. This would lead to a cost-benefit 
decision from the copyright owner, where the cost of renewal would have to be 
weighted with the remaining (if any) future profits from the abandonware, preventing 
thus the “idleness” of the owner who would prefer to stop its supply. However, 
because this solution would depend on an efficient pricing rule for the renewal fee, 
this would obviously be a difficult task when one think about the existence of a 
enormous variety of types, uses and categories of softwares. 
 
Finally, some kind of injunction remedy could also be imposed over the copyright 
owner, or liability mechanisms towards abandonware users. In the first case, some 
suggest any rule allowing for a commercially abandoned work to be necessarily used, 
provided that a few criteria (such as commercial unavailability, hardware restrictions 
and academic purposes) are met. In the alternative, a liability rule could also 
determine that the copyright owner would not be entitled to prevent the use of its 
abandonware, although it is imposed to users the payment of a fee – which would also 





Each of the three cases discussed above illustrate a particular aspect of dealing with 
international dissemination and protection of knowledge, beyond the usual state-to-
state public law relationship. Where international agreements, whether multilateral or 
bilateral, fail to account for the demands of local economic development, there still 
seems to be plenty of room available for groups and individuals to manipulate the 
legal tools, in order to facilitate their access and sharing of knowledge. 
 
The case of internet peer production, which has been gradually accepted by standard 
economic literature, demonstrates that the classic legal incentives for not sharing 
knowledge (and thus profiting from secrecy or IP monopolies) are no longer the most 
efficient strategy in certain productive environments, especially those highly 
dependent on copyright efforts such as software and literary works. This may be an 
interesting approach for many developing countries, which lack the resources and 
expertise to rely on monopolistic forms of knowledge dissemination. 
 
In contrast, the case of the Brazilian Cupuaçu provides evidence that the standard 
tools and procedures of IPR protection can now be used in an unconventional way: not 
in order to enforce an economic monopoly, but to protect the collective use of certain 
cultural endowments by local communities, thus becoming a strong paradigm for 
other developing nations. 
 
Finally, the case of the “abandonwares” remains in the very frontier of the expansion 
of IPR protection. In terms of economic and legal policy, it suggests that lawmakers 





abandoned works, in case it fails to make adequate use of them. In terms of 
development policies, this could create a major incentive for them to either drastically 
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